|Norman Fenton and Martin Neil|
In any given week a terrorist organisation may or may not carry out an attack. There are several independent cells in this organisation for which it may be possible in any week to determine heightened activity. If it is known that there is no heightened activity in any of the cells, then an attack is unlikely. However, for any cell if it is known there is heightened activity then there is a chance an attack will take place. The more cells known to have heightened activity the more likely an attack is.In the case where there are three terrorist cells, it seems to reasonable to assume the BN structure here:
"The single most important book on Bayesian methods for decision analysts" —Doug Hubbard (author in decision sciences and actuarial science)
"The book provides sufficient motivation and examples (as well as the mathematics and probability where needed from scratch) to enable readers to understand the core principles and power of Bayesian networks." —Judea Pearl (Turing award winner)
"The lovely thing about Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis with Bayesian Networks is that it holds your hand while it guides you through this maze of statistical fallacies, p-values, randomness and subjectivity, eventually explaining how Bayesian networks work and how they can help to avoid mistakes.” —Angela Saini (award-winning science journalist, author & broadcaster)Since the first edition of this book published, Bayesian networks have become even more important for applications in a vast array of fields. This second edition includes new material on influence diagrams, learning from data, value of information, cybersecurity, debunking bad statistics, and much more. Focusing on practical real-world problem-solving and model building, as opposed to algorithms and theory, it explains how to incorporate knowledge with data to develop and use (Bayesian) causal models of risk that provide more powerful insights and better decision making than is possible from purely data-driven solutions.
Dewitt, S, Lagnado, D, Fenton N. E (2018), "Updating Prior Beliefs Based on Ambiguous Evidence", CogSci 2018, Madison Wisconsin, 25-28 July 2018
This research is based upon work supported in part by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), under Contract [2017-16122000003]. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of ODNI, IARPA, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein. Funding was also provided by the ERC project ERC-2013-AdG339182-BAYES_KNOWLEDGE and the Leverhulme Trust project RPG-2016-118 CAUSAL-DYNAMICS.
People trust scientific experts more than the government even when the evidence is outlandish
Members of the public in the UK and US have far greater trust in scientific experts than the government, according to a new study by Queen Mary University of London. In three large scale experiments, participants were asked to make several judgments about nudges -behavioural in interventions designed to improve decisions in our day-to-day lives.Press reports:
The nudges were introduced either by a group of leading scientific experts or a government working group consisting of special interest groups and policy makers. Some of the nudges were real and had been implemented, such as using catchy pictures in stairwells to encourage people to take the stairs, while others were fictitious and actually implausible like stirring coffee anti-clockwise for two minutes to avoid any cancerous effects.
The study, published in Basic and Applied Social Psychology, found that trust was higher for scientists than the government working group, even when the scientists were proposing fictitious nudges. Professor Norman Fenton, from Queen Mary’s School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, said: “While people judged genuine nudges as more plausible than fictitious nudges, people trusted some fictitious nudges proposed by scientists as more plausible than genuine nudges proposed by government. For example, people were more likely trust the health benefits of coffee stirring than exercise if the former was recommended by scientists and the latter by government.”
The results also revealed that there was a slight tendency for the US sample to find the nudges more plausible and more ethical overall compared to the UK sample. Lead author Dr Magda Osman from Queen Mary’s School of Biological and Chemical Sciences, said: “In the context of debates regarding the loss of trust in experts, what we show is that in actual fact, when compared to a government working group, the public in the US and UK judge scientists very favourably, so much so that they show greater levels of trust even when the interventions that are being proposed are implausible and most likely ineffective. This means that the public still have a high degree of trust in experts, in particular, in this case, social scientists.” She added: “The evidence suggests that trust in scientists is high, but that the public are sceptical about nudges in which they might be manipulated without them knowing. They consider these as less ethical and trust the experts proposing them less with nudges in which they do have an idea of what is going on.”
Nudges have become highly popular decision-support methods used by governments to help in a wide range of areas such as health, personal finances, and general wellbeing. The scientific claim is that to help people make better decisions regarding their lifestyle choices, and those that improve the welfare of the state, it is potentially effective to subtly change the framing of the decision-making context, which makes the option which maximises long term future gains more prominent. In essence the position adopted by nudge enthusiasts is that poor social outcomes are often the result of poor decision-making, and in order to address this, behavioural interventions such as nudges can be used to reduce the likelihood of poor decisions being made in the first place.
Dr Osman said: “Overall, the public make pretty sensible judgments, and what this shows is that people will scrutinize the information they are provided by experts, so long as they are given a means to do it. In other words, ask the questions in the right way, and people will show a level of scrutiny that is often not attributed to them. So, before there are strong claims made about public opinion about experts, and knee-jerk policy responses to this, it might be worth being a bit more careful about how the public are surveyed in the first place.”
"...., which uses machine learning to predict whether a defendant will commit future crimes, was found to judge black defendants more harshly than white defendants."Interestingly, this latest news article about Microsoft does NOT refer to the 2018 Dressel and Fardi article but, rather, to an earlier 2016 article by Larson et al: https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm From a quick inspection it does seem to be a more comprehensive study than the flawed Dressel and Farid article. But my quick impression is that the same fundamental misunderstandings statistics/causality are there. Given the great degree of interest in AI/bias, and given also that we were unaware of the 2016 study, we plan to do an update to our unpublished paper.
As he sees it, the state of the art in artificial intelligence today is merely a souped-up version of what machines could already do a generation ago: find hidden regularities in a large set of data. “All the impressive achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting,” he said recently.Read it all.
|Norman gets his hands on Pearl's new book|
Constantinou, A. (2018). Dolores: A model that predicts football match outcomes from all over the world. Machine Learning, 1-27, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-018-5703-7
Constantinou, A. C. & Fenton, N. E. (2013). Determining the level of ability of football teams by dynamic ratings based on the relative discrepancies in scores between adversaries. Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports. Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 37–50. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jqas-2012-0036See also:
Open access version here.
Yet, B., Neil, M., Fenton, N., Dementiev, E., & Constantinou, A. (2018). "An Improved Method for Solving Hybrid Influence Diagrams". International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijar.2018.01.006 Preprint (open access) available here.UPDATE (22 Feb 2018): The full published version the paper is available online for free for 50 days here: https://authors.elsevier.com/c/1Wc6D,KD6ZG8y-
Yet, B., Constantinou, A., Fenton, N., & Neil, M. (2018). Expected Value of Partial Perfect Information in Hybrid Models using Dynamic Discretization. IEEE Access. DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2799527
|Kim Kardashian's tweet comparing risk from lawnmowers v terrorists triggered the award and debate|
The Royal Statistical Society’s first ‘International Statistic of the Year’ sparked plenty of online discussion. Here, Norman Fenton and Martin Neil argue against the choice of winner, while Nick Thieme writes in support.Our case, titled “A highly misleading view of risk”, was an edited version of a paper previously publicised in a blog post that itself followed up on original concerns raised by Nicholas Nassim Taleb about the RSS citation and the way it had been publicised. The ‘opposing’ case made by Nick Thieme was essentially a critique of our paper.
“You are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each containing money, one contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. Having chosen an envelope at will, but before inspecting it, you are given the chance to switch envelopes. Should you switch?”The problem has been around in various forms since 1953 and has been extensively discussed (see, for example Gerville-Réache for a comprehensive analysis and set of references) although I was not aware of this until recently.
If the envelope you choose contains $100 then there is an evens chance the other envelope contains $50 and an evens chance it contains $200. If you do not switch you have won $100. If you do switch you are just as likely to decrease the amount you win as increase it. However, if you win the amount increases by $100 and if you lose it only decreases by $50. So your expected gain is positive (rather than neutral). Formally, if the envelope contains S then the expected amount in the other envelope is 5/4 times X (i.e. 25% more).In fact (as pointed out by a reader Hugh Panton), the problem with the above argument is that it equally applies to the ‘other envelope’ thereby suggesting we have a genuine paradox. In fact, it turns out that the above argument only really works if you actually open the first envelope (which was explicitly not allowed in the problem statement) and discover it contains S. As Gerville-Réache shows, if the first envelope is not opened, the only probabilistic reasoning that does not use supplementary information leads to estimating expectations as infinite amounts of each envelope. Bayesian reasoning can be used to show that there is no benefit in switching, but that is not what I want to describe here.
Fenton, N.E., & Neil, M. (2018). "Is decision-making using historical data alone more dangerous than lawnmowers?", Open Access Report DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.20914.71363. Also available here.
|Kim Kardashian, whose tweet comparing the threats of lawnmowers and terrorists led to RSS acclaim|
Fenton, N.E., & Neil, M. (2018). "Are lawnmowers a greater risk than terrorists?" Open Access Report DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.34461.00486/1As you can see from the tweet by Taleb, this use of statistics for risk assessment was not universally welcomed.